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This paper sketches out the key elements of what we term a structuralist view of inflation. It 
is one that concentrates on four key elements: the role of aggregate demand; endogeneity of 
money; the role of productive capacity; and conflict over the distribution of income. In 
section 2 we elaborate on these four key elements. In section 3 we provide a formal 
treatment of some of the key elements of the structuralist view of inflation. In section 4 we 
bring forward empirical considerations in support of the theoretical model of inflation. A 
final section, section 5, summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.  THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 
 
In this section the elements of a structuralist view of inflation is sketched, which combines 
elements of Keynesian, Kaleckian and Institutionalist macroeconomics. It is  argued that 
there are four key elements of this view of inflation (and more generally on the 
macroeconomic workings of a market economy). We begin by observing that inflationary 
pressures emanate from two sources. The first we discuss is the level of aggregate demand in 
relation to productive capacity. The second emanates from conflict over income distribution.  
(i) One set of inflationary pressures comes from the level of demand relative to the size of 
productive capacity. There is no presumption that there is adequate capacity in an economy 
to support the full employment of labor, and hence enterprises may be operating at or above 
full capacity with substantial levels of unemployment. It has often been assumed that 
enterprises operate subject to (approximately) constant average direct costs and with 
significant excess capacity so that further expansion can be undertaken without costs (and 
presumably prices) rising. This “stylized fact” has often been invoked to explain some 
degree of price constancy with respect to the level of demand, and evidence (e.g. Sawyer, 
1983) supports the view that price changes are little related with the level of (or changes in) 
demand.  However, the view that average direct costs are broadly constant would add up to 
the point of full capacity, after which average costs may rise rapidly. 
(ii) A related set of inflationary pressures comes from the inherent conflict over the 
distribution of income. The ability of the economy to reconcile the conflict depends, inter 
alia, on the productive capacity of the economy (the “size of the cake”). The determination 
of an inflation barrier (as indeed in the literature on the NAIRU and on the “natural rate of 
unemployment”) involves the notion that wages and prices rise together with the difference  
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in the rate of increase of wages and that of prices being equal to the rate of labor productivity 
growth. In other words, the distribution of income between wages and profits would remain 
constant. This serves as a reminder that there are basic conflicts over the distribution of 
income. If all groups and classes in society were in effect content with the existing 
distribution of income, then it could be expected that there would not be a problem of 
inflation: at a minimum it would mean that the rate of inflation was constant. An increase in 
inflation can be viewed as arising from some combination of intention of some groups to 
increase their share of income and enhanced opportunity to do so. A higher level of demand 
for labor may, for example, be seen as enhanced opportunity for workers to increase their 
share. But a related higher level of demand for output would allow firms to increase their 
profits. The “conflict theory” of inflation can be seen as based on this insight.  
(iii) The level of economic activity depends on the level of aggregate demand, and there is 
no presumption that the level of demand will generate full employment of labor and/or full 
capacity utilization. Investment has a crucial dual role to play in our model. The first is 
through its impact on aggregate demand. The second is through its enhancing impact on 
capital stock. Further, there is no automatic mechanism, which takes the level of aggregate 
demand to any supply side equilibrium. The mechanisms, which feature in other approaches 
to economics, such as adjustment of real wages to clear the labor market, or the operation of 
the real balance effect, are explicitly rejected.  
(iv) Money is endogenous credit money created by the banking system. Money comes into 
existence through the loan process, and the extent of money creation depends on the demand 
for loans and the willingness of banks to satisfy that demand. Loans create bank deposits, 
which serves as money. The stock of money remaining in existence has to be held by some 
agents, and hence depends on the willingness of the public to hold money (what is usually 
called the demand for money). While the stock of money and nominal income rise broadly in 
line with each other, the direction of causation runs from nominal income to stock of money. 
The importance of endogenous money in our model emanates from the creation of loans 
aspect of it, which enables aggregate demand to take place.  
In the discussion below we refer to an “inflation barrier,” which corresponds to the 
level of economic activity for which inflation would be constant. If the level of aggregate 
demand pushes the level of economic activity much above that “inflation barrier” (and 
particularly if the rise in economic activity is rapid) then inflation rises. This “inflation 
barrier” has some similarities with a Nonaccelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU), but there are some important differences, at least of interpretation. The first  
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difference is that the NAIRU approach is generally embedded in a view that the level of 
demand will adjust to the NAIRU, usually through the operation of some form of the real 
balance effect.
1 In the approach developed here since money is treated as endogenous, there 
is no real balance effect, and we do not envisage that aggregate demand adjusts to the 
inflation barrier. Second, in the NAIRU approach there is a form of separation between the 
supply-side and the demand-side of the economy. In contrast here we stress that aggregate 
demand influences (and is influenced by) the rate of investment, which changes the capital 
stock, thereby having supply-side effects of productive capacity. This would also imply that 
the inflation barrier is continuously changing as investment occurs, and there is no 
implication that the inflation barrier remains unchanged over time. Third, the NAIRU 
approach has become associated with the idea that the structure of the labor market (notably 
the degree of rigidity or flexibility, however those terms may be defined) is the major 
determinant of the size of the NAIRU (and thereby of the level of unemployment). While, as 
will be indicated below, the conditions of the labor market may have some impact on the 
inflation barrier, it is not seen as a major determinant. 
 
3.  A STRUCTURALIST VIEW OF INFLATION  
 
The key features discussed in section 2 enables us to set up a model that captures a 
structuralist view of inflation. There are three segments to this model that capture the 
elements discussed in section 2. These are a wage equation, a price equation and an 
investment relationship. We begin with the wage equation. 
 
3.1 Wage Equation 
There are numerous views as to how wages are determined. Our approach differs 
substantially from those that view wages as set in a competitive labor market. At least in 
terms of the algebraic representation of the equilibrium relationship between real wages and 
employment, many of the approaches that are compatible with ours lead to similar 
outcomes―for example trade union bargaining models, efficiency wage models (for more 
                                                 
1 For example, in their influential book, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) portray aggregate demand as 
 y x r m p Dpe c d =     +    *+ ( - ) + + * 11 13 σ σ σ σ σ 12 14 15  
where x includes fiscal stance, world economic activity and world relative price of imports; the foreign real rate 
of interest is r* = I*  - Dp*e (nominal rate of interest minus expected foreign inflation), m - p is (log) real 
money supply, Dpe expected inflation and c* expected long run competitiveness. It can be readily seen that if 
the level of demand (yd) is to adjust to the level of output as set on the supply side, one or more of the variables  
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details see Sawyer, 2002, and Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, especially chapters 8 and 
9). 
We draw upon the target real wage hypothesis (Sargan, 1964; for detailed elaboration see 
Sawyer, 1982a, 1982b) based on a collective bargaining view of wage determination which  
can be set out as:   
(1)  ) ( 1 1 4 3 1 2 1 T p w a U a p a a w − − + + + = − − −
• •
  
where dot over variable indicates rate of change, w is log of money wages, p is log of prices, 
U is rate of unemployment and T  log of target real wages, the coefficient a2 may be close to 
unity, a3 and a4 are signed as negative. The rate of nominal wage increase depends on rate of 
inflation, unemployment (reflecting bargaining power) and the difference between actual 
real wages and target real wages. 
The equilibrium relationship when the rate of wage change equals the rate of (lagged) price 
change is given in equation (2): 
(2)  0 ) ( 4 3 1 = − − + + T p w a U a a   
assuming for convenience that a2 = 1. Defining unemployment as U=(Lf –L)/Lf where Lf is 
full employment (assumed given) and L is actual employment, yields 
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which gives a positive relationship between real wage and employment and is drawn as the 
w-curve (which reflect the wage determination process) in Figure 1. The inflationary 
dynamics (from equation 1) are such that for points below the w-curve wages rise faster than 
prices, and for points above wages rise less rapidly than prices. In terms of Figure 1, the 
position of the w-curve depends on the coefficients a1, a4 and the target real wage. In 
representational terms, any factor which could be viewed as changing one (or more) of those 
parameters would lead to a shift in the w-curve, and thereby in the inflation barrier.  
 
3.2 Price Equation 
We consider our price equation at two levels: first at the enterprise level and then at the 
aggregate level.  
                                                                                                                                                       
on the right hand side of the equation have to adjust. In this formulation, this would involve some combination 
of the fiscal stance, the real money supply and the expected rate of inflation.  
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Enterprise Level 
The short-run profit maximizing decision facing the enterprise is given by maximizing 
profits as in (4): 
(4) Π  = P(q,Z).q - W.l                                                                                     
where q = f(l, k), with f1 (the first partial derivative of f with respect to l) is positive, and f11 
(second derivative with respect to l) is seen as being initially positive and then negative (so 
that the marginal productivity of labor initially increases with the amount of labor and then 
declines). Furthermore, P is price charged by the firm, q enterprise output, Z is a vector of 
variables influencing the demand facing an enterprise including the level of aggregate 
demand, W the enterprise nominal wage, and l the labor input. Material inputs are omitted 
since their inclusion would complicate the analysis without being of importance to the points 
we wish to explore here.  
Using the level of employment as the key decision variable, with the capital stock 
and Z held constant, the first order condition for profit maximization yields: 
(5)   
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where f1 is the first partial derivative of f with respect to the first argument and e is the 
elasticity of demand. 
This equation provides only a point outcome: it is an equation in l (k being treated as 
given at this point; P and q being functions of l), which can be solved to give the level of 
employment, from which the level of output, real wage and price can be derived. In order to 
map out a relationship between real wage and employment based on equation (5), it is 
necessary to vary some exogenous variable. One way to map out a relationship between the 
real wage and the level of employment is to allow the Z variable (measure of aggregate 
demand) to vary, with the intensity of labor constant at the level set by the optimal (for the 
enterprise) wage. In particular, movements in the level of aggregate demand would generate 
movements in employment, real wage etc..  
Equation 5, therefore, is now written in the form: 
(6) W/P = m(cu) f1(l,k)    
where m is the inverse of the mark-up of price over marginal labor costs and it is expected 
that m1 (first derivative of m) is  positive (i.e. mark-up falls) for low values of u but negative 
for relatively high values, and the Z (aggregate demand variable) is suppressed.  
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Aggregate Relationship 
Lower case letters are used to signify quantities at the enterprise (plant) level and upper case 
aggregates. When there are n enterprises (plants), the aggregate output Q is given by :  
(7) Q = nq = n f(l, k)                                                                                                                 
where n is number of enterprises (plants). The “normal” level of capacity of enterprise is 
denoted by q*. Capacity utilization is cu = q/q*, and the mark-up of price over marginal 
costs is taken to be a function of cu. Now,  
(8) cu = q/q* = f(l, k)/q*       
with L = nl, and substituting into (6), we have:  
(9) W/P = m(f(L/n, k)/q*)f1(L/n,k)    
so that  
(10)  W/P = m(vf(L/n, k)/k)f1(L/n,k)     
where v is the ratio of capacity output to capital stock, i.e. k = v.q*. 
The relationship between W/P and L in equation (10) is drawn as the p-curve in 
Figure 1. The p-curve reflects the relationship between the real wage and employment 
derived from price determination considerations. The position and shape of that curve will 
shift with changes in n and in k. This p-curve represents (since it has been derived from 
profit maximizing considerations) the optimal real wage (from the enterprises’ perspective). 
The dynamics would be that from points above the p-curve, prices would rise faster than 
wages, and for points below, prices would rise less rapidly that wages. It should also be 
noted that movements along by p-curve would be generated by changes in the level of 
aggregate demand: in effect for a given level of aggregate demand enterprises would pick 
one point on the p-curve (corresponding to profit maximization). 
It can be readily shown that the sign of d(W/P)/dn depends on m1 and f11: at low 
levels of capacity utilization with f11> 0, d(W/P)/dn is likely to have a negative sign (in effect 
more plants, lower output per plant and higher unit costs), whereas with high levels of 
capacity utilization, with f11< 0 and m1  < 0, then d(W/P)/dn has a positive sign. The position 
of the p-curve depends on the size of the capital stock: the larger the capital, the further to 
the right will the p-curve be. The height of the p-curve depends on the capital intensity of 
production and the market power of enterprises. The greater the market power, the higher the 
price and the lower the real wage: hence the lower the p-curve. The sign of d(W/P)/dk will be 
positive when m1 and (f 2 – f/k) are both negative, that is when the inverse of mark-up falls 
with higher capacity utilization, and marginal product of capital is below average product.  
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Equations (3) and (10), drawn in Figure 1 as the w-curve and the p-curve respectively, 
involve real wages and employment and could be solved to give a supply-side equilibrium 
akin to an inflation barrier. The inflation barrier is formed by the interaction of price and 
wage determination, which is in terms of Figure 1 the intersection of the p-curve and the w-
curve. Since the p-curve depends on the size of the capital stock and the number of firms, so 
will the position of the inflation barrier.  
This does not imply that the economy will operate at or even tend towards that 
supply-side equilibrium―the level of economic activity will be set by the level of aggregate 
demand with no market forces tending to move the level of aggregate demand towards the 
inflation barrier.
2 Equation 10 (treated as a relationship between real wages and 
employment) will shift over time as the number of firms and the capital stock per firm 
change. The inflation barrier would be constantly changing as investment occurs. There is an 
in-built form of hysteresis in this approach―since the time path of aggregate demand 
influences investment, which causes the capital stock to change. In general a rise in the 
number of firms will shift the p-curve down for low levels of employment but up for high 
levels of employment. An increase in the capital stock per firm will in general shift the p-
curve upwards. An upward shift in the p-curve around the previous point of (supply-side) 




The approach to investment is Kaleckian in spirit (cf. Kalecki, 1943), with factors such as 
profitability and capacity utilization impacting on investment. The significant aspect of 
investment is that it is sensitive to the level of aggregate demand, and that there is not an 
optimal capital stock which is solely determined by relative prices.   
The rate of investment relative to the capital stock K is a positive function of the rate of 
profit (Π), and capacity utilization (cu), i.e. 
(11)  cu b  Π  b    b K  I 2 1 0 / + + =  
This can be mapped into a function of real wages and employment to give:  
(12)  /K K L  Y  b    /K K L Y L/Y W/P      b    b K I  ) , ( ) ) , ( )]( )( ( 1 [ / 2 1 0 + − + =   
since the share of profits is given by the expression: [1 – (W/P).(L/Y)], and K is a measure of 
capital stock. In the context of a net investment function and a no-growth economy (or 
                                                 
2 There may be policy forces that do so. For example when monetary policy is set according to some form of 
Taylor’s rule, then insofar as that is effective, demand will be diminished when inflation is high and/or rising. 
3 For an extended treatment of the p- and w-relationships, see Sawyer (2002).  
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treating all appropriate variables as normalized on the underlying rate of growth), the 
condition of a constant capital stock gives: 
(13) 0 ) ( ) ) ( ( )) )( ( 1 ( 2 1 0 = + − + /K L  Y  b    /K L Y . L/Y W/P      b   b  
from which a zero (net) investment locus can be obtained which involves a positive 
relationship between the real wage and employment. Two possible positions of the zero 
investment locus are drawn in Figure 1. IA when “animal spirits” are high and IB when they 
are low (investment is more often positive for IA than for IB). When aggregate demand is 
relatively high, then the economy would be operating to the right of the zero investment 
locus―net investment is positive, the capital stock is rising and the p-curve would be 
shifting upwards. 
It is important that this Figure is not interpreted in isolation with some idea that the 
inflation barrier is a supply-side equilibrium towards which the economy tends. We repeat 
the point above that there are no automatic forces pushing the economy towards the point 
where the p- and w-curves meet each other. Further the course of the economy cannot be 
understood without reference to the level of aggregate demand. In this context, aggregate 
demand is important not only in that it determines the level of economic activity (which may 
have some effect on the rate of inflation), but also through its influence on the rate of 
investment. The evolution of the capital stock would ensure that the stock of productive 
capacity changes, and that would be reflected in terms of a shift of the p-curve in Figure 1. It 
is also necessary to recall that money is viewed as endogenous, and hence as inflation 
proceeds, the stock of money will expand, but there is little point in attempting to control 
inflation through monetary policy (particularly through control of the money supply); 
inflation is not a monetary phenomenon. 
The level of aggregate demand in this framework can be derived (taking the case of a 
closed private economy for reasons of simplicity) by equating savings and investment, i.e. 
with a differential savings propensity out of wages and profits this is: 
(14)  )
) (
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The sign of this relationship may be positive or negative: in the terms of Bhadhuri 
and Marglin (1990) analysis, it will be positive if there is a stagnationist regime and negative 
if there is an exhilarationist regime. If the Keynesian stability condition applies, then b1+b2 – 
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s2 will be negative, and hence the sign of the relationship depends on s1 – s2 + b1. In Figure 2, 
the AD curve represents equation (15) under a stagnationist regime: the position and slope of 
the AD is arbitrary. It illustrates that demand differs from the inflation barrier, and the 
position of the AD curve will influence, in conjunction with the prevailing real wage, the 
level of economic activity and the pace of inflation.  
The p-curve and the w-curve may have substantial ranges over which they are near to 
horizontal, and if that is so, then any precise identification of the inflation barrier would be 
difficult and indeed the inflation barrier would be more like a plateau than a point. Further, 
since investment is always taking place, the p-curve would be continually shifting (even if 
that leads to rather small changes in the inflation barrier). It would also mean that inflation 
would be slow to rise (fall) as unemployment is lower (higher) than the point of intersection 
of the two curves in Figure 1. 
Three propositions follow from the analysis so far. 
1.  The position of the “inflation barrier” (akin to a NAIRU) depends on the size and 
composition of the capital stock. A larger capital stock per firm and a greater number of 
firms (often but not always) leads to the “inflation barrier” being at a higher level of 
employment with a higher real wage. 
2.  A larger capital stock will permit a higher level of aggregate demand (and higher level of 
employment, and lower rate of unemployment) without inflation tending to rise. 
3.  Investment depends on factors such as capacity utilization and profitability, which in turn 
are related to the level of aggregate demand. Hence, the evolution of the capital stock 
depends on the time path of the level of aggregate demand. Higher levels of aggregate 
demand lead to more investment, and over time a larger capital stock.  
4. Changes in labor market “flexibility” in terms of variations in wage differentials, 
changes in “hiring and firing” practices would be seen to have little effect on the inflation 
barrier. Where some effect may be present is when changes in, for example, trade union 
power, which is reflected in either the ambitions of workers in terms of the target real wage 
or in their ability to secure higher wages (reflected in the a1 coefficient), would shift the w-
curve. For example, a reduction in worker power shifts the w-curve downwards, thereby 
leading to an inflation barrier that involves higher employment. It would also be the case that 
changes in the power and/or profit ambitions of enterprises would impact on the inflation 
barrier: greater market power, shifting the p-curve downwards, would tend to reduce real 
wages and employment. 
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4. EMPIRICAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The approach to inflation, which has been sketched in the previous section, suggests a 
significant role for productive capacity and investment. The view is taken that there is no 
presumption that productive capacity is always sufficient to fully employ the work force, and 
that the level and composition of investment over time influences the evolution of the capital 
stock. There is then no presumption that there is some predetermined equilibrium capital 
stock such that the actual capital stock converges on that equilibrium stock. Since net 
investment is rarely zero (and generally positive), the capital stock is always changing, and 
hence the precise position of the inflation barrier is always changing. In what may be termed 
normal times, changes in the capital stock will be rather small with little by way of change in 
the inflation barrier. But times of major recession or of war reduce the capital stock 
substantially (at least relative to trend). In the other direction a prolonged investment boom 
increases the capital stock (relative to trend) substantially.  
Dow (1998) argues “that in a major recession underemployment results in the 
deterioration and premature scrapping of physical equipment, and that disbandment or 
underemployment of a firm’s workforce similarly results in the partial destruction of 
working practices and working relations. The latter constitute the intangible capital of a firm, 
the value of which is an important fraction of its market value as a going concern. The 
capital stock, physical and intangible, takes time to build up, and its destruction cannot be 
made good rapidly; in effect, therefore, the destruction is quasi-permanent. In this way 
demand shocks impact on supply. A major recession causes a downward displacement of the 
growth path of productivity (or potential or capacity output); after the recession, the “stable 
growth” mechanism described by the first mechanism will in the absence of further shocks 
start to operate again; i.e. normal growth will be resumed from the low point of the 
recession” (p. 369). He produces estimates of the impact of five major recessions in the UK, 
which are summarized in Table 1. 
The significance of this is that it implies that substantial (negative) changes in 
capacity can occur as the result of recession, which have long lasting effects, and is quite 
consistent with the views we have outlined above. Below we consider the falls in 
unemployment in the UK, U.S. and Canada during the 1990s, which occurred without an 
upswing in inflation, and argue that the major investment boom of the 1990s underpinned 
the falls in unemployment.   
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In this section we attempt to throw some light on the four issues raised towards the 
end of the last section. We begin by looking at the relationship between capital stock and 
unemployment. This covers the first two issues raised in section 3. Two further sections, one 
on the determinants of investment, and another on “labor market flexibility” complete the 
list. A brief section on regional unemployment renders support to our thesis on “labor market 
flexibility.”  
 
4.1 Capital Stock and Unemployment 
The increases in the level of unemployment experienced in the 1980s and into the 1990s as 
compared with say the 1960s (especially in Europe) were substantial. The oil price shock of 
the mid 1970s could be seen as effectively reducing capacity as heavy energy using plant 
and equipment became unprofitable. High levels of unemployment and excess capacity can 
be expected to have lead to a substantial reduction in the capital stock below what it would 
have been if there had been sustained full employment, and on the basis of the argument 
developed above, the increase in the inflation barrier correspondingly substantial. In some 
respects, this says little more than enterprises will adjust the capital stock to the prevailing 
demand for output (and level of employment). But it suggests a clear mechanism through 
which the level of (un)employment experienced will be reflected in the estimated NAIRU.  
There is  evidence to support this view, though the empirical work to which we refer 
has been undertaken within frameworks that have some similarities to the one outlined here, 
albeit with some differences as well. Arestis and Mariscal (1997) conclude from their 
empirical work for the UK (1966 to 1994) that “unemployment is significantly determined 
by capital shortages. Capacity is not fixed and investment depends on expected profitability 
and the expected long-term rate of interest” (p. 191). In a subsequent paper, they find that 
“the NAIRU is determined by long-term unemployment, worker militancy and the capital 
stock” (Arestis and Mariscal, 1998, p. 202). In work on Germany and the UK those authors 
(Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 2000) conclude that “adverse demand shocks 
affect employment and investment. When shocks reverse, unemployment may not fall to 
previous levels due to insufficient capital” (p. 487). Miaouli (2001) utilizes annual data from 
the manufacturing sector of five European countries and concludes that “the empirical 
analysis verifies that in all countries, accumulated investment in the private sector influences 
employment in a positive way” (p. 23). Rowthorn (1995) finds that “when manufacturing 
and services are combined, capital stock has a large, statistically significant impact on 
employment” (p. 33), in equations estimated for a cross-section of OECD countries. So that,  
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Rowthorn (op. cit.) concludes, “The problem of unemployment is ultimately one of 
investment” (p. 38).  
Stockhammer (2004) aims “to contrast and test the NAIRU hypothesis and a 
Keynesian explanation of unemployment in a time series context. For the NAIRU 
explanation, wage push variables are key to explain the rise of unemployment in Europe, for 
Keynesians the slowdown in capital accumulation is” (p. 21) the key. This proposition is 
tested using data from the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s for Germany, France, Italy, the UK 
and the U.S. He concludes that “the NAIRU specification performed poorly, with only the 
tax wedge having a positive effect on unemployment as predicted. As to the Keynesian 
approach, the role of capital accumulation was confirmed. Whereas capital accumulation is 
robust to the specification and can be pooled across countries, the tax wedge is not. In the 
Keynesian specification the tax wedge has the incorrect sign, however replacement ratios are 
significant with the predicted sign” (p. 21). 
  Further support comes from Alexiou and Pitelis (2003), where a panel-based study is undertaken
insufficient growth of capital stock and inadequate aggregate demand” (p. 628).  
 
4.2 Investment 
The role of investment in this approach is central, and we now briefly investigate the 
empirical validity of the proposition on investment. In a general sense, when studying the 
behavior of investment, we may refer to economic activity variables (such as capacity 
utilization), essentially based on the accelerator investment model, interest rate/cost-of-
capital variables and quantity of finance variables. The distinction between cost-of-finance 
and quantity-of-finance effects relies heavily on the assumption of imperfect capital markets. 
The imperfection of capital markets is explained by resorting to a number of factors, but 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, which might lead to credit 
rationing, is the most predominant one (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989). Financial variables and constraints are explicitly included in investment models 
through the usage of cash flow variables in the menu of explanatory variables for investment 
(see, for example, Minsky, 1975; Fazzari, 1993; Fazzari and Peterson, 1993).  
Financial factors as crucial determinants of investment have attracted a great deal of 
interest. External funds are no longer thought as perfect substitutes for internal funds, in 
view of the recognition that capital markets are imperfect. The quantity-of-finance variables 
can be internal finance variables (such as corporate profits viewed as a critical variable in 
terms of internal finance; high corporate profits indicate greater capacity by the corporate  
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sector to generate internal funds) and external finance variables (such as the ratio of debt to 
investment, an external cash flow component, on the assumption that a high debt 
environment is less likely to provide a stable financial base necessary for investment to 
materialize). Internal funds and net worth variables are thought to be particularly significant 
variables in the study by Hubbard (1998) where the relationship between capital-market 
imperfections and investment is reviewed. The conclusions reached are: “(1) all else being 
equal, investment is significantly correlated with proxies for changes in net worth or internal 
funds; and (2) that correlation is most important for firms likely to face information-related 
capital-market imperfections” (p. 193). The importance of the external funds and cash flow 
variables are also emphasized in studies by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989, 1999), and more recently by Greenspan (2002). The latter argues that “capital 
investment will be most dependent on the outlook of profits and the resolution of the 
uncertainties surrounding the business outlook and the geopolitical situation. These 
considerations at present impose a rather formidable barrier to new investment ….. A more 
rigorous and broad-based pickup in capital spending will almost surely require further gains 
in corporate profits and cash flows” (p. 7). Furthermore, empirical evidence, summarized by 
Chirinko (1993), supports the contention that “output (or sales) is clearly the dominant 
determinant of investment spending with the user cost having a modest effect” (p. 1881). 
Baddeley (2003) in a comprehensive study of investment also confirms the results of 
“previous analyses that capacity utilization and output have the strongest effects on 
aggregate investment activity” (p. 214). 
 
4.3 Labor Market Flexibility 
The case for labor market flexibility has been recently reiterated by the proponents of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) model. Issing (2003) puts it in the 
following strong language in testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs of the European Parliament: “The lack of determination to overcome structural 
inefficiencies is particularly evident in the labor markets of several EU countries. 
Impediments to employment creation continue to exist. Measures are needed that will 
encourage firms to hire additional staff. These measures need to aim at reducing firms’ labor 
costs, among other things, through reforms of social security systems that will reduce social 
security contributions and through reforms of the tax and benefit systems that will lower the 
wages at which workers are willing to supply labor. Improving employees' education and 
training and facilitating labor mobility could help the workforce to better react to adverse  
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economic shocks. In such an environment―of enhanced labor market flexibility―policies 
fostering labor force participation can be very effective.” Rigidities in the labor markets are 
actually widely held to play a key role in the explanation of high unemployment rates, 
especially in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Nickell, 1997; 
Nickell and Layard, 1999; Siebert, 1997; Elsmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998).  
Baker et al (2002) utilizing standardized unemployment rates for 20 OECD countries 
for the period 1980-1999, produce empirical results that are less robust and uniform across 
countries than what these studies show. These studies stress the “direct links” between labor-
market institutions and unemployment.
4 More concretely, Baker et al (2002) demonstrate 
that the cross-country evidence of these studies provides “no evidence” for union density, 
and only “mixed evidence” for the effects of unemployment benefits (both replacement ratio, 
the level of benefits relative to income, and duration of benefits), “active labor market” 
policies, and employment protection laws. As for structural reforms (or labor market 
deregulation), the authors argue that the usage of “the degree to which a country complied 
with their policy descriptions” is inappropriate. When the “volume” of reforms is used 
instead, there is no significant impact of structural reforms on NAIRU.  
The Baker et al (2002) study poses the question of “reverse causality” in the studies 
they discuss, to conclude that “While clearly not universal, this evidence of reverse causation 
provides serious grounds for viewing test results showing a correlation between high 
unemployment and long benefit duration” (p. 28). Similarly, these studies downplay the 
empirical support of the beneficial role of collective-bargaining co-ordination and active 
labor-market policies. As Baker et al (2002) suggest in their assessment of this literature 
“While the literature is widely viewed to provide strong evidence for the labor market 
rigidity view, a close reading of the leading papers suggests that the evidence is actually 
quite mixed, as several of the studies explicitly acknowledge” (p. 43). 
The study by Baker et al (2002) also provides own empirical evidence for 20 OECD 
countries spanning 40 years, 1960-1999.
5 Different time periods are utilized and different 
combinations of variables. The most comprehensive measure of institutions and policies 
utilized can only account for a minor part of the differences in the evolution of 
unemployment. The evidence in this paper provides little or no support for the labor market 
rigidity explanation. An index of the extent of labor market deregulation in the 1990s is 
                                                 
4 Labor market institutions are institutions (like union density) and policies (like employment protection laws). 
5 It is important to note that this data series covers the late 1990s when unemployment rates fell sharply in the 
20 countries included in the study’s sample.  
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constructed, but this variable too, showed no meaningful relationship between labor market 
deregulation and shifts in the NAIRU. 
Palley (2000) examines the OECD (1994a, 1994b, 1994c) Job Strategy, which had 
emphasized the role of labor market reforms and flexibility in reducing unemployment. He 
concludes (based on regression analysis of changes in unemployment in the mid-1990s) that 
“actions taken to reform labor markets do not explain any of the reduction in the rate of 
unemployment. There is some evidence that reforms of the educational system may have 
lowered total employment growth, which could be the result of young people staying in 
school longer. There is also stronger evidence that business sector reforms have lowered 
total employment growth, and reduced the quality of employment by slowing the growth of 
full-time employment” (p. 9). As Palley suggests this is indirect support for the view that the 
cause of high European unemployment is macroeconomic in nature. In a further study, , 
Palley (2001) presents empirical evidence that supports this conclusion. By accounting for 
micro- and macro-economic factors, and also for cross-country economic spillovers, it is 
concluded that unemployment in Europe emanates from “self-inflicted dysfunctional 
macroeconomic policy” p. 3.  
An OECD (1999) study is more damning to the “labor-market-flexibility” thesis. It 
covers the period late 1980s to late 1990s and utilizes new and improved data on 
employment legislation in 27 OECD countries. It utilizes multiple regression analysis and 
techniques, so that it is able “to control for other factors that can influence unemployment” 
(p. 88). The study demonstrates that employment protection legislation (a measure of labor 
market flexibility) has small or no impact at all on total unemployment.
6 Consequently, 
dismantling employment protection would not solve the current unemployment malice in the 
27 countries considered in the study.     
  
4.4 Regional Disparities of Unemployment 
There are generally considerable variations in the rate of unemployment across the regions 
of an industrialized market economy: there are, of course, other important variations in rate 
of unemployment, e.g. between ethnic groups. For convenience, we will refer here to 
regional variations. 
                                                 
6 The employment protection legislation is defined broadly and covers all types of employment protection 
measures resulting from legislation, court rulings, collective bargaining or customary practices. The OECD 
(1999) study considered a set of 22 indicators, summarized in an overall indicator on the basis of a four-step 
procedure (pp. 115-118).   
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The labor market interpretation of the NAIRU stresses the role of labor market 
institutions, laws and regulations, minimum wages and unemployment benefits in the 
determination of the NAIRU. Now it can be observed that these are typically characteristics, 
which apply across the whole of the economy. Laws on trade unions, regulation of labor 
markets, unemployment benefits and minimum wages are characteristics, which apply to the 
whole economy and do not (in general) vary from area to area.
7  It is, we suggest, 
implausible to think that the variations in unemployment, which are observed between the 
different regions of a country (or indeed between say urban and rural areas, or between 
ethnic groups) can be explained by variations in the labor market characteristics of the 
regions involved. It is much more plausible to view the variations in unemployment as 
arising from the industrial structure of a region and from variations in productive capacity as 
well as in aggregate demand of the region. 
In contrast, the inflation barrier approach, which we have outlined above readily 
explains the differences in unemployment across regions in terms of differences in capacity 
and differences in the demand for the products of a region. Further, if differences in the 
position of the p-curve across regions (through differences in productive capacity) are 
substantial, then there would be the observation that across regions there is a positive 
relationship between real wage and employment as the w-curve is mapped out. This would 
be consistent with the findings of a wage curve with such a positive relationship (see, for 
example, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). 
 
4.5 Declining Unemployment and Low Inflation in the 1990s 
After 1992, Canada, U.S. and UK experienced declining unemployment and generally 
declining inflation. France and Germany also experienced generally declining inflation but 
alongside rising unemployment in the case of Germany, and rising then falling around a high 
level in France. These experiences during the 1990s are well illustrated in Charts 1 and 2. 
The combination of falling unemployment and declining inflation in Canada, UK and U.S. is 
notable. At the beginning of the 1990s, most estimates of the NAIRU for the U.S. were in 
the range of 5.5 to 6.5 percent,
8 while for the U.K. NAIRU estimates ranged from 6 to 8 
                                                 
7  There are exceptions to this: for example, the minimum wage may differ across regions reflecting perceived 
differences in the cost of living. In a Federal system, such as the U.S., there can be variations in the 
employment laws. 
8 “Tightness in the labor market is measured by the excess of CBO’s estimate of the nonaccelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU) over the actual unemployment rate. It is an indicator of future wage inflation” 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1994, p. 4), and that Office uses an estimate of 6 percent for the NAIRU.  
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percent.
9 The estimates of OECD (2000) for the five countries considered here are given in 
Table 2. As is generally the case, estimates of the NAIRU tend to track the path of observed 
unemployment.  
We suggest here that the relative experience of these five countries is consistent with 
the arguments advanced above. From 1992 onwards, Canada, UK and U.S. experienced high 
rates of growth of investment, whereas France and Germany did not. This is illustrated in 
Chart 3. Between 1992 and 1999, private sector non-residential investment grew by 95 
percent in U.S., 64 percent in Canada and 58 percent in the UK, whereas it grew by 3.5 
percent in Germany and 16 percent in France. On OECD estimates, all five countries had a 
substantial negative output gap in 1993. However, the growth of investment and of the 
capital stock meant that the decline in unemployment in Canada, UK and U.S. went 
alongside only modest rises in the gap between actual output and capacity output.  
 
5. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
A formal model of the inflationary process has been put forward, which may be 
characterized as the structuralist view of inflation. The key elements of this view have been 
put together in a formal model. We have argued that the essentials of this model are 
validated by existing empirical evidence. We have also used the 1990s experience in relation 
to unemployment and inflation. The conclusions reached in this part of the paper provide 









                                                 
9 “The sustainable rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, is believed to have risen in the UK during the 1970s and 
1980s, but there is broad agreement that this increase has been partly reversed since the late 1980s. Although 
the magnitude of any fall is very difficult to estimate, most estimates of the current level of the NAIRU lie in 
the range of 6 to 8 percent on the LFS measure of unemployment. However, considerably lower levels should 
be achievable in the long run through re-integrating the long-term unemployed back into the labor market, 
upgrading skills, and reforming the tax and benefit systems to promote work incentives” (Treasury, 1997, 
p.82).  
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TABLE 1: Estimates of Depth of Recession or Scale of Fast Growth as Compared with 
Trend in the UK* in Terms of GDP Growth 
 
   Estimate   
Recession Start  End  Method  A Method  B 
1 1920  1921  -10.3  -10.3 
2 1929  1932  -11.9  -11.9 
3 1973  1975  -7.8  -8.3 
4 1979  1982  -10.  -10.0 
5 1989  1993  -11.6  -10.4 
Fast growth 
phases 
    
1 1922  1925  4.7  4.7 
2 1933  1937  9.5  8.5 
3 1972  1973  4.1  4.3 
4 1985  1988  7.4  6.4 
 
Notes: 
* Percentage change in output from start to end of recession or fast-growth phase less (years x annual trend 
percentage growth rate) 
Method A “assumes changes in percentage of labor unemployment during a major recession measure the 
degree to which overall economic capacity is unemployed.” 
Method B “makes use of the short-term relationship between output and employment.” 
Source and Quotes: Dow (1998).  
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TABLE 2: Estimates of NAIRU and Actual Unemployment (percent of labor force)  
 
  Estimates of  NAIRU Actual Unemployment Change, 1990-1999
 1990  1999 1990 1999 NAIRU  Actual
France  9.3 9.5 8.6 11.1 0.2 2.5
Germany  5.3 6.9 4.8 8.3 1.6 3.5
Canada 9.0  7.7 8.1 7.6 -1.3  -0.5
UK 8.6  7.0 6.9 6.0 -1.6  -0.9
U.S. 5.4  5.2 5.6 4.2 -0.2  1.4
 
Source: OECD (2000), Table V.1, Annex Table 21 
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